Historical Catholic Apologetics on the Council of Constance and the Decree Haec Sancta
Paulus Fabrolottus:
The fifth argument that many adversaries take up is from the Council of Constance. At that time, in the fourth session of that council, it defined that a general council [concilium generale] has authority immediately from Christ, which all are held to obey, even if he be Papal in dignity. Thus, either the council was approved by a Roman Pontiff or it was not: either it is legitimate, or it is not. If it is legitimate and was approved, then it is also a matter of faith that a council is above a Pope. If it is illegitimate and rejected, it could not have deposed John XXIII, nor could it have elected Martin V. If Martin V was not legitimately elected and wasn’t a true Pope, though, then no Pope would be a true Pope in the Church, since they all succeed Martin. I respond: the council of Constance is approved and is legitimate in part, and is also rejected in part. Because the approval of the council depends on the Pope, and he can approve some decrees and reject others, it is not extraordinary if one and the same council is legitimate in one particular thing, and not so in another matter.
For many councils are approved in part and rejected in part. The Council of Chalcedon decreed some things against the wishes of Pope Leo, namely that after the Bishop of Rome, the Bishop of Constantinople should have the first place, as we said above, and that did not have authority for a long time, though in other matters the council was confirmed by Leo. Therefore, when the Council of Constance elected Martin V, it was legitimate. For John XXIII and Gregory XII withdrew their claim and agreed to the election of Martin, as it is seen in session 12, and in session 14 when Clement, the successor of Benedict XIII, also agreed. Thus, there can be no controversy about Martin. And because the council decreed opposing John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII, not all bishops who were obedient to Gregory and Benedict assented to this definition, nor was this decree confirmed by subsequent Popes, but was rejected at the Councils of Florence and the Lateran, as was said above.
Therefore, although the election of Pope Martin was legitimate, the deed in Session 4 should not be judged as a decree, as it is invalid. Some object that Pope Martin, in the last session, confirmed all decrees on faith arising from this council: this decree pertains to faith, therefore if Martin was a true Pontiff, this decree was approved. I respond that Martin, eloquently, only explicitly said that he confirmed those decrees that are on faith and were done in a conciliar manner [lit: conciliariter]. It is agreed that this decree was made against the will of the Popes then reigning, without any examination from them. Therefore, it is not contained under the approval given by Martin V. Moreover, Martin only approved those decrees against John Huss and John Wycliffe, he makes no mention of this decree. I respond secondly with Turrecremata, Campeggio, Sander, and other most learned men, that the Council of Constance, when it decreed a council to be above a Pope, speaks concerning schismatic presumption and not a legitimately elected, true and undoubted Pope, which we showed to be above a council.
For, at that time, there were three Popes, John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII, when the controversy was being debated, namely whether a council is above a doubtful Pope. In this sense, therefore, I say the council should be understood, in which, at this time, this question was being debated, in which sense this decree says nothing against what we have taught thus far. You say that Lateran V under Leo X, which we mentioned above, defined something against the Council of Constance, when it defined that the Pope is above councils. Therefore, the Council of Constance truly defined that councils are above a Pope. I respond, it did so because the council of Constance that determined a council is above a Pope could be understood as concerning a true Pope, which is presumption and intrusion against a Pope. Therefore, the Council of the Lateran, lest any be misled by the Council of Constance, defined a true Pope to be above councils. From this, we can gather that their opinion is without any foundation, which says that a council is above a Pope. Since their particular foundation is the decree of the Council of Constance., yet the decree of this council is not valid and cannot be understood of a true Pope, their opinion is without any basis.
Citation: Fabrolottus, P. De potestate papae supra concilium. In G. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova Et Amplissima Collectio (Vol. 23, pp. 680–681). Leipzig.
Bartholomaeus Caranza:
What is alleged from the Council of Constance has no force because the acts of that assembly were not ratified, nor were they approved by Martin V. And in the bull promulgated by Martin, nothing was directly mentioned of these decrees, which our adversaries cite, and for that reason, they should not firmly hold that decree.
Citation: Caranza, B. Quatuor controversiarum de authoritate pontificis et conciliorum explicatio. In G. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova Et Amplissima Collectio (Vol. 23, pp. 680–681). Leipzig.
Jean Le Jau:
Objection: The canons of the Councils of Constance and Basel state that the Pope is subject to the canons concerning faith and the reformation of ecclesiastical practice.
I respond: Add, “for the time of the schism,” or “for the extirpation of schism,” as the Council itself records, since there was no other cause for this statute there when (as we said a little bit before) it certainly was not known who was the true Pope. And this is not, properly speaking, saying that the council has power over the Pope, or that the Pope is subject to the canons of a council, because a dubious Pope is held to be no Pope at all. So also the Council of Constance, in Session 4, did not define this in such a way as questions concerning faith are defined.
I. Because it was not a general council at the time when, from the three parts (in which the Church was then divided), hardly even a third (certainly those which adhered to John XXIII) were in agreement, but they [the rest] were fighting, and an agreement could not be reached by the other two parts, who were obedient to Gregory XII and Benedict XIII.
II. Because there was then no certain Pope in the Church, nor in the council, without which, however, matters of the faith cannot be defined. Thus, John XXIII, who had begun the council, had already left prior to the fourth session being held. Nor was it by Martin V, who some say was the Supreme Pontiff who gave confirmation of the decree, since when Martin confirmed his assent to many of the decrees of the Council concerning faith which are done in a conciliar manner [conciliariter], that is, having it done with diligent examination, as is the custom of the other councils. Indeed, no such thing can be said concerning this decree from the synod, since it was done without any examination (as it clear from the acts themselves). And concerning the Council of Basel, we see it beginning legitimately, yet it ended illegitimately, seeing as it was revoked by the Supreme Pontiff Eugene IV.
Add that, however legitimate the decree of Basel is said to be, it was rejected by the later council of Lateran V. “Only the Roman Pontiff,” it says, “has authority over all councils, as well as full right and power over the calling, transferring, and dissolution of councils, as the testimony of the Sacred Scriptures, holy fathers, and other Roman Pontiffs state, not to mention the clear confessions of the councils themselves.”
Citation: Le Jau, J. (1622). Tractatus de summi pontificis auctoritate, in quatuor distinctum libros (p. 604). Paris.
Tommaso Campeggi:
But because the decree of the synod of Constance would seem to conflict with that which we expounded prior, we have considered it worthwhile to investigate its force. The decree’s words are the following: “First, it is declared, that this general council itself, assembled in the Holy Spirit, and representing the Catholic Church, has power immediately from Christ, and anyone of any status or dignity whatever, even if he be Papal, is held to obey in matters which pertain to faith and the extirpation of the said schismatics and the reformation of the said church in head and in members. It also declares that anybody of any status or dignity, even if he be papal, who will have contumaciously refused to obey the mandates, statutes, or ordinances of this holy synod, or any other legitimately assembled general council which has been or will be, regarding the aforementioned or that which pertains to those matters, unless he had turned [from this error], would be subject to fitting penance and appropriately punished, also having recourse to other remedies of law (if necessary)."
Which decree is found verbatim in the Council of Basel, Session 11.
To protect the authority of the Roman Pontiff, almost everyone did not receive the decree, but rejected it, and that rejection is based on many reasons:
First, since, at that time, this act was decreed while it was not a whole and plenary council, gathered with universal consent, but only one obedience was present while there were three who were contending for the Pontificate. The evidence of this is in sessions 21 and 35, wherein, when the other obediences had joined, it was necessary to convene the council anew, which is an implied acceptance that, prior to the new convening, it was not a council.
Second, if the council of Constance, after the joining of the other obediences which did not acknowledge John XXIII to be the true Pope had supposed themselves to constitute a true council prior, it would not be necessary to decide to decree something already established, namely, for what reason and in which way the Pope may be corrected and deposed. However, session 40 states that “the Pope is held to obey the council in those matters which pertain to the faith, and the extirpation of schism, and the general reformation of the Church of God; and he should be punished if he will refuse to obey.” From which it seems to be gathered for what reason and in which way he can be corrected and deposed.
Third, the same is gathered from the letters of Martin V to the German bishops in approving the holy council, in which he expounds the previously held articles of John Wycliffe and John Hus, which were previously condemned in the council, and that suspected persons in matters of faith are ordered to be asked "whether they believe that St. Peter was the Vicar of Christ, having the power of binding and loosing," also whether they believe "that a canonically elected Pope who holds office at that time is the successor of St. Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God." For if they would consider this decree [i.e. Haec Sancta] ratified, these decrees would fight each other: that the Pope has supreme authority in the Church, and that he is held to obey a council, since he who is of lesser authority cannot judge he who is of greater authority, nor can the former subject the latter to his decrees. See Distinction 21, canon inferior.
Fourth, the same conclusion is deduced from the rejection of another error [#27 in Session 15] of John Hus, namely, “that there is not the least proof that there must be one head ruling the church in spiritual matters who always lives with the church militant.” For if it is necessary that there be one head of the Church (namely the Pope) since it always abides with her, he will not be held to obey a council, and much less will he be able to be corrected and punished by it.
Fifth, the same seems to be confirmed from the fact that nowhere is it established that Martin confirmed or considered certain this decree. Indeed, rather the opposite is discovered, since he appointed presidents for the Council of Siena. For he gave the council the authority around the reformation of the Church in its members only, nothing is mentioned concerning the head. And he gave the council authority to carry out the other things which would not diminish his own status.
But another objection arises, which can be made: if the decree did not cause the men to stop, John XXIII could not have been deposed by the council because of a defect of jurisdiction, since the decree [was false, but the power of a council to depose] followed from it; and since John had not been rightly removed, Martin could not have been elected Pope. Those [who reject Haec Sancta] say in reply: Martin’s election is efficacious, not because the Chair was empty from the removal of John XXIII, but from his free renunciation, since, even if it was done while he was being held in custody by them, still he confirmed it when he was fully free, not under force. And at Florence, he professed that he yielded and renounced of his own accord, not coerced or forced. Add, also, that John was lawfully deposed because of heresy because in his suspension in Session 10, he was said to be a notorious heretic and incorrigible in morals. Although it was not pronounced in the sentence, still it is enough if those words are said because those crimes then expressed and others brought forward and included in the process were so shameful, harmful, and ruinous, the holy synod deposed him.
They [who reject Haec Sancta] respond to another objection, which is that Martin V, in condemning the errors of John Hus and others, declared that it is an error not to believe that the Roman Church is supreme among other churches. [They say] if we understand the ‘Roman Church’ to mean the universal Church or a universal council, or insofar as someone denies the primacy of the Supreme Pontiff over particular churches, then this is true. From which, it seems to be gathered that it is not an error to deny the primacy of the Roman Pontiff over the universal Church. And Haec Sancta decrees that the Pope is held to obey the mandates of the Church and the general councils that represent the same. To this response, they answer that this is not correctly inferred by the argument from the contrary, which is sometimes unsound: just as if we were to say, ‘there is smoke, therefore there is fire,’ this is rightly inferred. Yet if we were to say, ‘there is fire, therefore there is smoke,’ it does not follow, nor is it rightly inferred from an argument from the contrary, just as any excessive or unevidenced inference can likewise be drawn from the arguments we have developed elsewhere.
Indeed, concerning the renewal of the decree, done by the Council of Basel, they assert that it in no way harms the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff because, although the Council of Basel was called and began legitimately under the authority of Martin V and Eugene IV and was legitimately continued from the letters of Eugene IV concerning its annulment, dissolution, and transportation, the decree from it would still not be valid, as it was protested by the Apostolic legates and presidents. Just as, although it was legitimately gathered, the decrees at the Council of Ephesus II were null and void. And whatever is decreed by other councils, if it was not confirmed by the Apostolic See, is null and void, as will be discussed elsewhere.
But if we wish to follow these men, we are amazed that Jean Gerson, Chancellor of Paris, a man of the keenest intellect and of the highest learning, would rejoice concerning a decree of this sort, and give thanks to God, who finally decided the matter and ended the controversy of superiority between the Pope and council. This is because, if prior to this decree, there was doubt about which of them would be superior, and also doubt about which of them could declare it, then we consequently cannot see how the question of whether the council is superior can be considered to be declared by the council itself (especially in its own favor), concerning which that very matter is doubted, since decreeing such a thing belongs to the superior authority.
We, however, think that that decree possesses force, and that it does not diminish the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Because if the Pope (God forbid) were to lapse into heresy, the council does not have power over him who is the true Pontiff, but over him who has been Pontiff, seeing as heresies will have stripped him of all authority and power. Truly, in the case of schism, namely when two or more contend for the pontificate, when it is unknown which of them is Pope, the council has power over those who are not considered Popes. For just as that which is not known to be consecrated is regarded as not consecrated and stands in need of consecration (See Distinction 1, canons Vienens, De presbyteris non baptizatis and Solennitates, De consecratione ), so he for whom it is unknown whether he is a true Pontiff is regarded as no Pontiff at all. So, one who has power over him is not counted as having power over the Pontiff. These words are supported by Distinction 79, canon Si duo forte contra fas, and concerning the decrees about which we are speaking, we can clearly collect that, in those two cases, a council is bestowed with power over a Pope. Nor should the words “anyone of any status or dignity whatever, even if he be Papal, is held to obey,” deter anyone because he is called Pope in the prior cases in which the council has authority [over him], just as a dead or imaginary man is still called a man.
Moreover, those fathers of Haec Sancta wanted that decree to be enforced in time of schism, and not when there was one, undoubted Pontiff. And where it says in the second part of the decree that "it also declares that anybody of any status or dignity, even if he be papal, who will have contumaciously refused to obey the mandates, statutes, or ordinances of this holy synod, or any other legitimately assembled general council which has been or will be,” etc, it refers to similar cases of schism or heresy by the Roman Pontiff, in which cases he is rightly subject to a council. Nor does “to the reformation of the said Church in head and in members” refer to anything except the irregular conditions arising from schism or heresy, when the true pope is lacking, to whom it belongs to reform the Church. Thus, where the decree says “in head and in members,” it is interpreted concerning a doubted and uncertain head, when the council has jurisdiction over him, and not if the Pope is certain and undoubted.
Since we cannot deny that the wording of the decree is vague and admits of a twofold interpretation, and since it is rightly feared that it may one day give occasion to schism, as experience at the Council of Basel has taught, it would seem a prudent safeguard for Christendom to act, lest the fear of similar disobedience and schism restrain Roman Pontiffs from convoking councils, and lest what the Council of Constance wished to occur more frequently should, by virtue of its own decree, occur more rarely. It would therefore be expedient to promulgate a decree of this kind, which was perhaps the intention and purpose of the Council of Constance when, in Session 40, it decreed that it must be determined and established for what reasons and in what manner a pope might be corrected and deposed. Accordingly, taking up what the Council of Constance decreed, it would seem appropriate that the decree be clarified and its wording definitively settled concerning the controversy over the superiority of Pope and council—so that all may understand that the coercive authority granted to a council applies in cases when multiple individuals claim to be Roman Pontiff and there exists, for just reasons, doubt as to which of them is truly Pope, or when the Pope lapses into damnable heresy and persists in it despite admonition. In the same way we should consider the council’s power to reform the Church in head and members: namely, in the two aforementioned cases, and not when there is one, undoubted Pontiff, unless he is himself present in the council or special authority concerning the matter has been granted.
And without doubt, this was the intention and design of the Council of Constance, which Basel wrongly interpreted, and thus, falling into error under the pretext of the reformation of the Church, usurped all papal power. For they dealt with the major cases in council, taking upon themselves the judgment of the cases of cathedral churches; they annulled provisions made by the pope and declared them void; they conferred and entrusted ecclesiastical benefices; they sent legates a latere to govern the provinces; they took cases from the Roman Curia; they set tithes; they distributed plenary and perpetual indulgences; and they did almost everything else which pertains to the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff. On account of which, when it was done, Pope Eugene IV, moved by such disgracefulness of the situation, dissolved the council again, and transferred it to Ferrara. And what followed was a terrible schism, so that there were now not just two Popes, but even (as they thought themselves) two councils, of whom neither yielded in the least to the other, but hurled censures and threatening reproaches at each other, so that, as Antoninus, the Archbishop of Florence, joked, “Basel has given birth to a basilisk.” To which point, we again proclaim in a clear voice that a clarification will be necessary (which we consider more honorable than a revocation) seeing as the University of Paris and many others, notwithstanding the decree of the Council of Florence, stubbornly uphold that decree of Constance and Basel.
Citation: Campeggi, T. (1555). De auctoritate et potestate Romani Pontificis (pp. 90-96). Venice.
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